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Cooperation should be big business, but the main question is: ’How to reach a state of
cooperation and how to cut the cake if it comes to cooperation?’ Here by cake we mean
the cost savings or extra-gains generated by cooperation. The success of cooperative
ventures often relies on agreements on how to share the costs and/or beneﬁts generated.
Cooperative game theory and sharing problems are closely interrelated in practice. An
overview on the game theoretic literature on sharing rules can be found in the work of
Tijs and Driessen (1986) and Young (1994). For an introduction in cooperative game
theory we refer the reader to the books of Tijs (2003) and Peleg and Sudhölter (2003).
Cost/reward allocation is an important practical problem arising from many diﬀerent
real-world situations. There is no single, all purpose solution to the sharing problem. In
satisfying the existing need for suitable mechanisms to distribute cost/reward among the
agents involved, organizational constraints and goals, environmental aspects as well as
the amount of available information should be taken into account. Joint ventures require
an allocation mechanism which is eﬃcient, fair, and provides incentives to (diﬀerent
groups of) agents involved to agree upon.
Often sharing situations can be modelled as coalitional games. A coalitional reward game
consists of a player set and a characteristic function with assigns to each coalition of
players a real number that is to be interpreted as the maximum proﬁt or cost savings that
the members in this coalition can realize when they cooperate. To describe a situation
where a group of people can decrease their costs by working together a coalitional
cost game can be used, where the characteristic function assigns to each coalition its
costs. To each coalitional cost game one can associate a related coalitional reward game,
which is usually called the corresponding cost savings game. Advantages of modelling
sharing situations as coalitional games are that one is forced to structure the underlying
situation, and that game theoretic solution concepts which are based on considerations
concerning coalitions of players can be applied.
We assume that all players of the game will cooperate to form the grand coalition and
cope with the problem of allocating the worth of the grand coalition among them. Such
an allocation is called eﬃcient. Further, an allocation for players in a cooperative (re-
ward) game is called stable if each coalition receives at least its value. The need for
an eﬃcient and stable allocation makes the core (cf. Gillies (1953)) an attractive solu-
tion concept for all groups of) players. Classical solution concepts in cooperative game
theory are the Shapley value (cf. Shapley (1953)), the τ-value (cf. Tijs (1981)), and3
the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler (1969)). These solution concepts satisfy three diﬀerent
systems of axioms. The Shapley value is the unique solution concept which satisﬁes the
eﬃciency property, the dummy player property, the symmetry property and the addi-
tivity property. The τ-value is the unique solution concept (for semi-balanced games)
which satisﬁes the eﬃciency property, the minimal right property and the restricted
proportionality property. The nucleolus is the unique solution concept which satisﬁes
the eﬃciency property, the individual rationality property and the consistency prop-
erty. The choice of a speciﬁc solution concept is often based on the properties that are
appealing for the situation at stake.
The coalitional games arising from ’phoning in plane’ situations have, as we see in Section
4, a speciﬁc structure which is relevant for the approached situations and provides strong
arguments to choose a speciﬁc division of the revenues in such situations. In our opinion
’phoning in planes’ situations provide nice examples of how theory and practice may
interact.
In general, it is a diﬃcult task to ﬁnd a suitable model of the practical situation at
hand and, moreover, to give a transparent division scheme for the players involved. To
stress the diﬃculties in using cooperative game theory for help in advising, we include
here a small but signiﬁcant part from the contribution of Michael Maschler to the Game
Practice I conference volume (2000):
’To sum up, when we make a recommendation on a cooperative-type real issue we are
faced with a problem of choosing the right solution concept. To make a good decision
we have to examine the foundations of the solution concept to see how they ﬁt reality.
The decision, however, may also depend on the coalition function we choose to model
the situation. Again, we have to examine the real case in order to make a choice. It
is not suﬃcient to recommend a certain solution on the ground that game theory has
deﬁned it. One has to justify why the particular solution is appropriate to the speciﬁc
issue.’
This paper is mainly intended to show that the use of Cooperative Game Theory for
help in advising, or in mechanism design, has seen some notable successes. But, we
would like to stress that much work has still to be done in this direction to increase the
use of game theory by society. Further, there is still a lot of new ground which can and
should be explored by Game Theory. The Game Practice conferences (1998, 2000, 2002,
2004), the ZiF year ’Procedural Approaches to Conﬂict Resolution’, etc. are helpful to
bridge the still existing gap between theory and practice.
The outline of this contribution is as follows. In Section 2 we give a list of seminal4
sharing problems arising from practice. Two cases of cooperation in container transport
are treated in Section 3, and two cases of telecom cooperation are extensively discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 concludes with lessons which can be learned from the cases.
2 Cooperative game theory with an eye outside
In the past many sharing problems arising from practice were important in the devel-
opment of cooperative game theory, either as supporters of already known theory or as
an inspiration source for new directions. We can mention here some problems:
(i) The Tennessee Valley Problem (cf. Ransmeier (1942) and Driessen (1988)), where
some proposed rules were related to the τ-value of the related game. The Tennessee
Valley Problem has been faced by the Tennessee Valley Authority when solving the
question about (the price of) electricity power in its program. The Authority had
to prepare allocations of the costs of the Wilson Dam and of additional reservoir
projects which the Authority might implement among ﬁve objectives: navigation;
ﬂood control; development of power; national defence; fertilizer production.
(ii) The airport fee problem (Littlechild and Thompson (1977)) where the principle
’the users pay and they pay equally’ corresponds to the Shapley value of the
related airport game. The problem in airport situations is how the cost of a
runway should be distributed among users who need runways of diﬀerent lengths
for their airplanes. For airport fee problems where there are restricted beneﬁts we
refer to Branzei et al. (2002, 2003) and Tijs and Branzei (2004).
(iii) The bankruptcy problem (O’Neill (1982), Aumann and Maschler (1985)) where
the nucleolus of a related game corresponds to proposals for bankruptcy in the
Talmud. A bankruptcy problem arises from a situation where an estate has to be
divided among several claimants, each of them with a claim on the estate, and the
aggregate claim exceeds the available estate.
(iv) The Cornell telephone bill problem (Billera (1978)) where games with a continuum
of players played a role. The ’internal telephone billing rates’ problem at Cornell
University is well known. The question here is: ’How to charge local calls, long-
distance calls, etc. to the diﬀerent departments?’ This problem led to the literature
of Aumann-Shapley pricing (1974) in multi-commodity cost sharing problems.5
(v) Cost sharing problems in irrigation situations (Aadland and Kolpin (1998), Koster
et al. (2001)) where weighted Shapley values and weighted constrained egalitarian
solutions were interesting. The sample of irrigation ditches used by Aadland and
Kolpin (1998) is drawn from Carbon and Stillwater counties of Montana, USA. It
consists of a main ditch for common use from which private ditches branch oﬀ and
transport water to diﬀerent users’ parcels of land. The main ditch begins with the
headgate — a device that controls the volume of water delivered from the source
stream — and then continues on a sequential path through the land consisting of
parcels of each user. Each user is individually responsible for expenses incurred
on their private ditches, so the problem is how to share the costs associated with
the main ditch.
The last 30 years the interaction between cooperative game theory and Operations
Research was also important. It created all kind of Operations Research Games (Curiel
(1997), Borm et al. (2001)). We mention a few: linear production games (Owen (1975)),
minimum spanning tree games (Bird (1976)), sequencing games (Curiel et al. (1989)),
traveling salesman games (Potters et al. (1992)), and holding games (Tijs et al. (2000)).
In many of these situations the optimization problem for the grand coalition and the
sharing problem could be treated simultaneously, leading to interesting taylor made
sharing allocations (produce and pay, construct and charge, switch and share, ...).
3 Cooperation in container transport
In this section we consider two cases. In the ﬁrst case container transport with trucks
from Rotterdam to Germany and the awareness of gains in cooperation (less container
movements with almost empty containers) led to cooperation of three ﬁrms where one
ﬁrm played a special role because this ﬁrm had developed an (excellent) routing program.
The Regiefunctie Informatietechnologie and Telecommunicatie (R2i) of the Gemeentelijk
Havenbedrijf Rotterdam contacted the Game Theory Group of Tilburg University. In
fact it was the ﬁrm owning the routing program who contacted us via R2i, which we call
for this reason in the following the ’problem owner’. The three parties alone could not
reach an agreement because of the problem of how to compensate the ’problem owner’
for the development costs of the routing program. We constructed two cooperative 3-
person games vb and v, where the game vb should be used the ﬁrst three years and the
game v the later years. The game vb was more advantageous for the problem owner
because it was also meant to compensate the problem owner for the development costs6
of his routing program. It turned out that the game vb had a special structure which
could be related to the structure of so-called big boss games. A big boss game (cf. Muto
et al. (1988)) is a coalitional game where there is one player with veto power — the big
boss — and the characteristic function satisﬁes the monotonicity property and the union
property. Such a game has the τ-value as an interesting solution in the barycenter of the
core. After our proposal the three ﬁrms started working together almost immediately.
For more details of this case we refer to van Os (1997).
In the second case only the R2i contacted our game theory group. They had observed
that the ﬁrms transporting containers over the Rhine from Rotterdam to the Middle
Rhine did not work together in container transport, in contrary to the ﬁrms active on
the Upper and the Lower Rhine. Again we have used cooperative game theory and
constructed a cooperative game and proposed a solution. In this case there was no
problem owner. It turned out that big extra gains could be made in cooperation but
the ﬁrms did not react. An extensive description of this case can be found in the work
by Nielen (1994).
It is diﬃcult to explain why our advice was followed in the ﬁrst case, but not in the
second case. In our opinion the presence of the problem owner in the ﬁrst case has been
beneﬁcial for incentivating cooperation. In the second case the ﬁrms alone were well-
doing and this could explain their lack of interest in cooperation. The diﬀerent attitude
towards cooperation in the two cases could also be explained by diﬀerences in cultural
factors. There was also a diﬀerence in the nature of transport — container transport
by trucks to Germany for ﬁrms in Rotterdam harbour versus transport by ships within
Middle Rhine region — which could also inﬂuence the willingness to cooperate.
4 Telecom problems and cooperative game theory
In this section we give a description of two situations in telecommunication in the be-
ginning of the nineties of the last century and show how the related sharing problems
were tackled by means of cooperative game theory. Our exposition is mainly based on
the work of van den Nouweland et al. (1996).
The situation we describe ﬁrst concerned a public telephone service for passengers in
airplanes in which the telephone connections are established by radio communication
to a near ground station, from where the connections are provided to the destination
subscriber using the existing network. Such a system was called the Terrestrial Flight
Telephone System (TFTS). To launch this service, which is economically attractive only7
if it is suﬃciently wide-spread, several national operators had to cooperate by installing
the necessary apparatus in airplanes and by placing ground stations that could make it
possible to use the service when ﬂying over the countries. A group of European operators
decided to cooperate and agreed upon the conﬁguration of ground stations to be placed
such that the overlap between stations is minimal and each operator will place (and pay
for) the ground stations that are planned to be placed in his country. The problem that
they had still to solve was to agree upon how to divide the revenues that will be (po-
tentially) generated through TFTS. Two existing proposals, namely PI, which splits the
total revenue proportionally to the investments of the countries, and GR, that lets each
country have the revenues which are generated via the ground stations it installs, have
been proved to be unappealing for reaching cooperation. To ﬁnd acceptable divisions
of the revenues van den Nouweland et al. (1996) have modelled the TFTS situation
as a coalitional game by taking the countries whose national operators and the plane
company participate in the cooperation to be the players. The characteristic function is
such that for each coalition of players the revenue that its members can jointly realize
within the cooperation of the countries is the sum of the revenues that are generated by
one and two countries within that coalition. The basic data, i.e. the revenues generated
by telephone calls that are made from airplanes of each cooperating country ﬂying over
any country, were computed by using real data from Reed Travel Group-ABC Interna-
tional and the Deutsche Bundespost. The coalitional game associated with the TFTS
situation is the sum of an additive game and a nonnegative 2-game (i.e. a nonnegative
combination of unanimity games based on 2-person coalitions) implying that the game
is convex. Since for the class in which the TFTS game is a member the Shapley value,
the nucleolus and the τ-value coincide (and occupy a central position in the core of
the game), it has been a strong argument to recommend this speciﬁc division of the
revenues. This proposal has been proved to be very appealing. Indeed, given that it
satisﬁes three axiom systems, one can think that it must be hard to ﬁnd other divisions
that make sense a priori. It has been cooperative game theory helping to gain insight
into the sharing problem arising from the TFTS situation.
The second situation analyzed here concerns the rerouting of international telephone
calls. The circuits can be used more eﬃciently if during busy hours the calls are routed
via quiet parts of the international network instead of routing them via direct circuits
from the originating country to the destination country (see Gibbens et al. (1991)). So,
by cooperating and making agreements on the use of transit routes, international carriers
are able to use their circuits more eﬃciently and to reduce the costs of their network. The8
use of transit routes is, in general, limited to two link paths to prevent that telephone
calls bounce back to the originating country, and also that congestion on one link will
aﬀect the whole international network. Hence, in order to generate proﬁts through the
rerouting of an international telephone call, exactly three international carriers have to
cooperate: a carrier from the originating country, a transit carrier, and a carrier in the
destination country. The rerouting of international telephone calls situation could be
modelled as a coalitional game, where the players are the international carriers, and for
each coalition of international carriers the worth is deﬁned to be the sum of cost savings
that are obtainable by subcoalitions of size 3 of that coalition. The coalitional game
corresponding to the rerouting of international telephone calls is a sum of nonnegative
3-games implying that the game is convex, and, consequently, it has a nonempty core.
So, it has been shown via cooperative game theory that it is worthwhile for international
carriers to cooperate and reroute their international telephone calls during busy hours.
Two important solution concepts, the Shapley value and the τ-value, coincide for the
rerouting game and oﬀer an appealing way to divide the gains from cooperation such
that not only all individual carriers, but also all coalitions of international carriers are
better oﬀ than they would be if they did not cooperate with the other carriers.
In both telecommunication situations the contractors have been very thankful to us, but
given the ’secret’ feature of this research we do not know yet in how far our proposals
were actually implemented. Note that we could consider the Dutch Telephone Company
as the problem owner. Finally, we would like to confess that during this research there
was a lot a communication, but we have had the feeling that many things were not
disclosed to us.
5 Concluding remarks
The Tilburg Game Theory Group learned many lessons from their advising practice
described in Sections 3 and 4. To know the client and the problem well we took care
that a master student worked in the ﬁrm full time for some months and a PhD student
one day a week during that period. Further there were regularly meetings between
members of the ﬁrm and the Game Theory Group of Tilburg. The biggest problems
were:
( i )t og e ti n s i g h ti nt h ec o o p e r a t i v es i t u a t i o n ;
(ii) to ﬁnd the good estimate for the characteristic function of the involved cooperative9
game;
(iii) to ﬁnd a sharing rule for the cake, which is clear and appealing for the clients.
In the cases of ’phoning in planes’ and ’container transport by trucks’ there was already a
conﬂict history before we entered. We were able to ﬁnd new viewpoints on the problems
which made the advice successful. We were successful in situations were one of the
players (the problem owner) interacted with us. It would be interesting to study all
kind of interactions and get some insight in the ‚best’ one.
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